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ABSTRACT 
This paper investigates the determination of corporate cash holdings in Vietnam. The sample includes 
Vietnamese publicly-traded firms for the period 2010-2013. Determinants include financial indicators as 
firm-specific characteristics and state ownership as an institutional factor for the purpose of exploring the 
existence of agency costs for this emerging market. Findings of the study suggest that the theoretical 
frameworks, namely trade-off model, pecking order theory and free cash flow theory, are at work for the 
Vietnamese sample. Significant determinants are profitability, firm size, leverage, dividend payout and 
investment in asset tangibility. However, the findings do not confirm the largely found relationship 
between market-to-book ratio and corporate cash holdings for Vietnamese firms, which is normally 
expected to be positive in sign. At industry level, findings for determinants on cash holdings by different 
industry sectors show a significant variance, especially for the sectors that are mainly composed of state-
own enterprises (SOEs). In general, sectors with mostly private firms mirror the results of the entire 
sample better. Although agency problems due to state ownership are detected at industry level, they are 
not severe in general. 
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CORPORATE CASH HOLDINGS: 
DETERMINANTS AND IMPLICATIONS FROM VIETNAMESE MARKET 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Let us all agree that cash is important. But not until the financial world witnessed the 
Lehman Brothers collapse in 2008, triggering the financial crisis and shattering worldwide 
confidence, did cash become a more critical thing than ever as governments made every 
effort to provide liquidity to rescue as many of their banks and financial institutions as 
possible from ending up with the same fate as the US giant bank. Just after a few days since 
Lehman Brothers filed its bankruptcy in the US, on the other side of the Atlantic Ocean were 
so many major banks and financial institutions also preparing to get bankrupt and collapse 
that The European Central Bank had to inject an extra €30bn (£24bn) to boost liquidity and 
the Bank of England £5bn while back in the US the Federal Reserve had just doubled the size 
of the rescue package to $200bn and the ten biggest investment banks raised a $70bn 
liquidity pool for any one of them to tap. The non-financial sector all over the world was also 
seriously hurt. Construction companies all across Europe and real estate firms found they had 
no cash, because the housing market was as if it had never existed. Many industrial firms, 
especially the automobile and heavy manufacturing firms, also suffered so deeply that in 
order to regain essential liquidity level, they changed their manufacturing as well as sourcing 
strategies dramatically, cut production volume, and made employees redundant to save every 
dollar of cash. The ‘cash death’ did not exempt even growing and excellent performing firms 
because they simply could not survive if they ran out of cash or did not get enough cash 
inflows. 
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1. Background of the study 
As one saying goes, ‘revenue is vanity, cash flow is sanity, but cash is king’, whilst it may 
appear better to have good inflows of revenue from sales, cash on hand is still the most 
important focus for a business to stay on. Businesses may be able to continue to operate in 
the short-to-medium term even if they are making a loss as long as they can delay paying 
creditors or have enough money to cover variable expenses. Despite of that, it cannot survive 
long if its immediate needs are not fulfilled with cash. 
More than five years after the financial crisis, there have been records of cash held by 
households as well as corporations. Cash and its important role are now the business focus as 
a large number of the world’s biggest non-financial companies are now building up some 
trillion dollar gross cash pile, according to a study by advisory firm Deloitte. Obviously 
companies are now clinging to cash in a precautionary manner because spending on capital 
expenditure is still slowly increasing, especially where the effects of the crisis can still be 
seen. In another recent analysis by Standard & Poor’s, non-financial companies worldwide 
were said to be underinvesting; and if a more ‘normalised’ recovery path had been followed 
in 2012 and 2013, an extra $900bn of cash would have been spent by these companies over 
those two years. In light of this recent study on cash holdings, it is relevant to raise the 
discussion about whether companies are holding too much cash and how it can be justified. 
More interestingly, what are the implications and adjustments as a result of this cash excess? 
Management that aims to maximize shareholder value would technically set the firm’s cash 
holdings at a level such that the marginal benefit and the marginal cost of those holdings are 
equal. The former can be referred to as the transaction costs saved as firms do not have to 
raise external funds and do not need to liquidate assets to make payments; and because 
external funds are sometimes extremely costly to acquire, firms with good liquidity holdings 
can use this internal fund to finance its major operating activities and investments. The first 
benefit is described by Keynes (1934) as the transaction cost motive for holding cash, while 
the second one as the precautionary motive. The possible costs of holding cash include the 
low rate of return of the liquidity assets and tax disadvantages. Other costs have evolved 
from brokerage costs, according to Miller and Orr (1966), to costs that are incurred by 
inefficient investment activities due to insufficient liquidity, as shown in theoretical models 
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such as Myers (1977) and Myers and Majluf (1984). Some empirical works have also 
emphasized this kind of cost.  
So theoretically, from the perspective of maximizing shareholder wealth, this trade-off view 
can contribute to answering whether a company is holding too much cash from an ‘optimal’ 
level. However, alternative to this trade-off theory is the view about the irrelevance of cash 
holdings which can be implied from the irrelevance of capital structure theory because cash 
is negative debt. This alternative view is also supported by the pecking order theory, first 
theoretically developed by Myers and Majluf in 1984. And yet cash holdings under this 
pecking-order, also known as the financing hierarchy model, is hardly consistent with the 
shareholder value maximisation providing that there is a cost to holding cash and 
shareholders would be better off if excess cash is used for dividend payouts or share 
repurchases.  
As the discuss goes on in the above direction, there have been a lot of both theoretical and 
empirical studies on cash holdings so far, including famous works on the popular topic of 
what determines cash holdings and its implications (Opler, 1998) as well as further works on 
different types of relationships between cash holdings and corporate governance (Dittmar, 
2003), ownership concentration (Ameer, 2012), firm structure (Subramaniam, 2010) etc. The 
literature related also goes largely as it does deeply since there have been also numerous 
researches on cash holdings topics for different parts of the world’s economy.  
2. Research objectives 
The purpose of this paper is to examine the determinants of corporate cash holdings in 
Vietnam. As Thieu (2013) researched on manufacturing firms in Vietnam but only to 
investigate the firm-specific determinants, this paper is intended to complement his work 
both horizontally and vertically:  
(1) by covering firms across more industrial sectors  
(2) by analyzing more deeply the impact of agency costs on cash holdings level since this 
issue has been proved to play a significant role in a major part of previous literature on 
developed countries. 
 
 
6 
 
 As emerging market contains a number of imperfections and problems, especially problems 
concerning information asymmetries and ownership structures (a considerable number of 
firms are state-owned), it is believed that these objectives are important and relevant for the 
research under this topic.  
3. Research questions 
(1) What are the determinants of cash held by enterprises in Vietnam, and 
(2) How do they differ in terms of implications, in particular for agency costs in state-owned 
corporations, from findings of previous studies of cash holding determination in 
developed market?  
 
4. Motivation for the study and its significance 
In Vietnam, as well as in other emerging Asian countries, there has been a credit crunch as a 
form of resonance effect from the financial collapse in the western part of the world as 
Vietnamese economy has long been in a strong relationship with the US in exporting and 
importing. Historically Vietnamese firms depend heavily on short-term bank loans and the 
recent high interest rates situation in Vietnam has somewhat affected cash holding 
behaviours, which is believed to be an exciting topic to explore. More importantly, 
investigation into emerging market can significantly contribute to the knowledge of the field 
as there will be a relatively different settings, regarding macro-economic since Vietnamese 
economy is still in its transitional stage to become a market-oriented on and both equity and 
capital markets are still in the incomplete state. On micro-economic level, there are  
differences between the way firms are operated and governed in Vietnam compared to 
countries in developed market. One of the major differences is that corporate governance is 
still a fresh concept and is attracting a lot of attention as to how to have it well introduced 
and then applied and how to harmonize it with state regulations.  
However there are not many researches or studies on this aspect of corporate finance for the 
Vietnamese market, hence this research is carried out with an aim to contribute to a larger 
coverage of the literature in the field. 
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5. Research method and findings 
Research is carried out on 172 publicly-traded firms on Ho Chi Minh Stock Exchange 
(HOSE) and Hanoi Stock Exchange (HSE) for the period from 2010 to 2013. Data on cash 
holdings and firm-specific factors in local currency is collected from Bloomberg database.  
Results from multiple regression using OLS methods reveal their consistency with most of 
the findings for developed markets, with less significant though, in terms of the impact of 
firm-specific determinants. However, when state-ownership is considered as an important 
input there are differences regarding the impact of those determinants even though the 
magnitude of those differences are only insignificant.  
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Section II reviews the previous literature 
of the topic in question, including theoretical and empirical studies; Section III explains the 
development of hypothesis, the collection and process of data and the methodology; Section 
IV discusses the findings and their implication; and Section V concludes the paper. 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Empirical studies about the determinants of cash holdings by corporate have recently 
occupied a central place in the vast corporate finance literature. According to Gill and Shah 
(2012) cash holdings include ‘cash in hand or readily available for investment in physical 
assets and to distribute to investors’. It is therefore viewed as cash and cash equivalents 
which can be easily converted into cash. Modigliani-Miller payout policy irrelevance says 
that if the capital markets are perfect, a firm’s choice of payout or retention of its excess cash 
is irrelevant and does not affect the value of the firm. However, corporate taxes make it 
costly for the firm to hold excess cash. Despite of that, some firms still accumulate their cash 
balances, which help firms minimize the transaction costs of raising external fund when 
potential cash needs are to be met. Apart from that, there would be no added value to 
shareholders of firms retaining too much cash than needed. 
1. Why do firms hold cash? 
As the starting point of view, Keynes theory (1936) states cash is held because of transaction 
cost and precautionary motives.  
1.1 Transaction cost motive 
Based on this, a transaction cost model is evaluated by Opler et al (1999), who then conclude 
that the model implies that if it is costly for a firm to raise funds, the amount of cash held will 
increase if there is an increase in cash flow volatility and the length of the cash conversion 
cycle. However, with the inclusion of tax, cash holdings will decrease as the cost of holding it 
increases with the marginal tax rate. An alternative view to the tax disadvantage is that 
multinational firms tend to accumulate tax to take advantage of tax consequences (see Foley, 
Hartzell, Titman, and Twite 2007). Other factors that can impact cash holdings magnitude 
include interest rates and the slope of the term structure, cost of raising debts, the easiness of 
selling assets, cost of hedging risk and the size of a firm’s dividend (Opler, 1999).  
Support for the transaction cost motive can also be found in the results of the same paper of 
Opler et al (1999). There found supportive evidence that firms with strong growth 
opportunities which have potential NPV investment projects, firms with riskier activities and 
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firms of smaller sizes, because of asymmetric information, tend to hold more cash than other 
firms. Meanwhile firms that have greater access to the capital market, most of which are large 
corporations and those with favorable credit ratings, hold less cash. These results are 
consistent with the view that firms hold liquidity to enable ongoing investment, and to reduce 
costs of raising funds when these costs are excessively expensive. Sample for this well-
established research includes publicly traded U.S firms in the 1971-1994 period. 
1.2 Precautionary motive 
As for the precautionary motive, managers often choose to retain excess cash in order to 
reduce a firm’s leverage ratio as well as to solidify their job security. Under this motive for 
corporate cash holdings, cash is held as a buffer to protect firms against adverse cash flow 
shocks. Also found in the same paper of Opler et al (1999) is evidence consistent with this 
explanatory view for holding cash since results show management accumulates excessive 
amount of cash when it is possible to do so. This is often referred to as the agency motive. 
According to free cash flow theory of Jensen (1986), entrenched managers would prefer to 
retain cash than increase payouts to shareholders – even when the firms have poor investment 
opportunities. Cross-country evidence is also found by Dittmar, Mahrt-Smith and Servaes 
(2003) that corporate cash holdings are higher in countries with greater agency problems. 
Cash is also found worth less when agency problems are greater between insiders and outside 
shareholders (Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith, 2007 and Williamson, 2006). 
 
In summary, the initial motives for corporate cash holdings are transaction, precautionary, 
agency and possibly, tax motives. Among these, more and more studies and researches work 
on the impact of agency problem on cash holdings in terms of retention and spending of 
excess cash, as shown in work of Mahrt-Smith (2007) and Harford, Mansi, and Maxwell 
(2008) where there is evidence suggesting entrenched managers who build excess cash 
balances are more likely to spend that cash quite quickly. Other impacts of agency problem 
have also been worked on to investigate the relationship between cash holdings and 
ownership concentration (Ameer, 2012); cash holdings and protection level of investors rights 
(Lee Pinkowitz, René Stulz and Rohan Williamson, 2003) with evidence implying the 
importance of agency costs in the way minority investors value cash holdings by corporations. 
Another interesting finding about agency problem from the same perspective is from the 
 
 
10 
 
paper of Elion Jani, Martin Hoesli and Andre Bender (2004) with results showing that cash 
holding behaviour is substantially affected by the institutional context as firms with less 
concentrated ownership keep more cash; and firms with different voting right share 
experience slower cash holdings adjustments than firms with simple and unique voting right 
structure. 
 
2. Cash holdings and their determinants 
Not until Tim Opler et al. established their paper on cash holdings in the US did cash 
holdings determinants start to attract more and more attention from academics and analysts, 
who later make use of the developed model in the paper to go deeper and larger to approach 
the topic from many other perspectives. For the last ten years the literature of the field has 
largely and deeply expanded since researches on cash holdings have shown interests, in 
addition to determination of cash holdings, in the relationships between cash holdings and 
other aspects of a corporate such as ownership concentration, firm structure, shareholders 
protection and markets of different level of information symmetries, etc. There are recent 
works that look at the issue at industry or national level, or by comparing between industrial 
sectors or nation groups. Most of these works have their models developed from the original 
model of Opler (1999) by adding new variables and/or conditions while some directly use it 
to investigate the effects from the model application in other markets that have not been 
studied on before. However, before we start the discussion of these recent empirical studies it 
is necessary we first address the studies that established the theoretical foundation for later 
works in the modern literature. 
2.1 Theoretical framework 
In a world with the existence of transaction costs, agency costs and information 
asymmetries, the cash holding determination debate will be approached within the two 
important theoretical frameworks: the tradeoff theory and the pecking order theory. 
a. The tradeoff theory. Under this theory, firms can set an optimal level of liquidity holdings 
by weighing the marginal costs and marginal benefits of holding liquidity. Some of the 
benefits include (1) reducing the likelihood of financial distress, (2) ensuring the 
continuance of investment policy implementation, and (3) avoiding as much as possible 
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the costs of raising funds of selling assets to increase liquidation (Ferreira and Vilela, 
2004). The cost of holding liquidity is often associated with the opportunity cost of 
holding them because of the lower rate of return on those liquid assets.  
This cost is also referred to as the liquidity premium by Opler (1999) whose discussion of 
liquid assets’ opportunity cost suggests that this cost would be highest for cash, and to 
decrease for assets that go down in their level of cash substitution. For instance, liquid 
assets held as demand deposits will have their opportunity cost increase with interest rates.  
Another cost of holding liquid assets is taxes, especially where interest income from those 
assets is taxed twice. Also according to Opler (1999), the cost of holding liquidity will 
increase with the corporate marginal tax rate. 
 
b. The pecking-order theory. The pecking-order theory view of cash holdings stems from 
that theory of capital structure proposed by Myers and Majluf (1984). Information 
asymmetries make it more difficult to seek outside financing. Investors want to ensure that 
their securities purchase is not overpriced so discount them appropriately. However, since 
outsiders know less than insiders (management), their discounting approach may 
underprice those securities, which means that the more information sensitive a security is, 
the higher the cost of raising outside fund. As a result of these information asymmetries 
and signaling problems associated with external funding, a financing hierarchy is 
considered with preference of internal over external resources.   
Where information asymmetries become more and more important, firms may be forced 
to reduce investment in case of cash shortage, and hence involving greater costs. This cost 
of financial distress is expected to be greater for firms with high R&D expenses as those 
expenses are seen as a type of investment where information symmetry is almost 
impossible. Consequently, firms with higher R&D expenses are more likely to have 
higher holdings of liquidity assets (Opler and Titman, 1994). 
 
c. Other theoretical discussions: Agency costs of debt and of managerial discretion 
Agency costs of debt arise when there is an interest conflict between those of shareholders 
and those of debtholders. This type of conflict may also appear among various classes of 
debtholders. This problem means more difficulties and more costs for more highly 
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leveraged firms seeking external resources. As argued by Jensen and Meckling (1976), 
debt will be more expensive for those firms both in terms of return rate and attached 
covenants. So in order to avoid these costs of debt, firms with potential valuable 
investment projects are expected to hold more liquidity – even though maintaining a low 
level of leverage can also be helpful to avoid those high costs of debts. 
Under the agency costs of managerial discretions, cash is held so that management can 
pursue its own objectives at shareholders’ expense. Specifically, the entrenched 
management may be simply risk averse and holding excess cash can help it avoid market 
discipline. Therefore anti-takeover firms are more likely to be found to hold excess 
liquidity (see Opler et al., 1999). Another possibility is that excess cash facilitates 
management to pursue investment projects. In this case cash is not negative debt because 
the capital markets may not be willing to finance those projects, which means 
management may not be able to raise debt whenever it needs to while it can use the cash 
whenever it wants to. The third cause for these agency costs is that management prefers 
keeping funds inside the firm than distributing to its shareholders, as suggested by the free 
cash flow theory of Jensen (1986). As a result of this, under this theory, management is 
likely to spend the cash on poor projects when there are no good ones available because it 
needs to find ways to make use of the cash available (also see Ferreira & Vilela, 2004). 
But if a firm has numerous valuable opportunities to invest these costs will become trivial 
since in this case the objectives of management and shareholders are likely to coincide. 
Theoretically, in order to help align interests of management and those of shareholders 
management is expected to hold part of the shares. But still, according to Opler (1999), 
management may get more risk averse because of that managerial ownership, hence 
expected to hold more cash when the ownership increases. 
In summary, the theoretical background usually has the tradeoff and the pecking order and 
the free cash flow theories to explain the pattern of liquidity holdings. There could be an 
optimal level of cash holdings by equaling their marginal costs and marginal benefits 
according to the tradeoff theory; meanwhile the pecking order theory of Myers (1984) 
does not suggest a cash holding target because there is a preference of internal funds to be 
used before external resources are considered. However the phenomenon of asymmetric 
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information, which helps explain the pecking order model, does make cash held as a 
buffer between retained earnings and potential investment needs. Lastly, the free cash 
flow theory of Jensen, which contributes to explaining the agency costs of managerial 
discretion, describes managers’ incentives to pile up cash to get more assets under their 
control as well as to acquire more power in hand over the firm’s investment decisions.  
The next discussion includes review of empirical evidence for cash holding and its 
determination found in previous literature. 
2.2 Empirical studies on cash holdings determinants 
As described by Cossin and Hricko (2004), one of the important roles of liquidity holdings for 
a firm’s operations is that they help ensure optimal timing of investments and avoid the under 
pricing issue. However, excess of cash held within firms with fewer investment opportunities 
can reduce firm value (Easterbrook, 1984; Dittmar et al, 2003). This explains why cash 
holding’s determination attracts much attention from company managers, financial analysts 
and researchers. Empirical studies on this topic mostly employ the model developed by Tim 
Opler et al (1999) to investigate how influential the factors related to firm characteristics can 
be on cash holdings level. These factors and their proxies include financial distress (leverage 
and R&D expenses ratios), investment opportunities (market-to-book ratio), cash flow 
riskiness (standard deviation of industry cash flow) and liquid assets substitution (net working 
capital less cash). Problem of agency costs of managerial discretion is also largely considered 
in these empirical studies, inserted as a dummy variable in the model with proxies being 
ownership percentages between management and the firm’s shareholders. 
The next discussions will be dedicated to discuss researches on different types of market. 
Since this paper’s purpose is to provide more evidence to the field’s literature with more 
insight into markets other than those that have already been studied, this literature review will 
start discussing the studies on developed countries. Researches which focus on the emerging 
market will be reviewed later. 
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2.2.1. Determinants of cash holdings: Evidence from developed markets 
Several pioneering studies on cash holdings include works on the US manufacturing sector, 
by Nadiri (1969) and then Campbell and Brendsel (1977), with data from 1948-1964 and 
from 1953- 1963, respectively. The former investigated the desired level of real cash 
balances, with results showing determinants of demand for real cash balances being 
outputs, interest rates, expected rates of change in general price levels and factor prices. 
The latter used OLS regression analysis methods to examine how compensating balance 
requirements can impact cash holdings and found that those requirements are not binding. 
The most influential work in the field by Opler et al. (1999) also examines the US market, 
but more complete and firm characteristics-oriented. Data was collected for the period 
from 1971 to 1994 from 1048 listed firms in the US for the purpose of finding 
determinants of corporate cash holdings and their implications. By carrying out time-series 
and cross-section tests, they came to the findings that firms with strong growth prospects 
and more volatile cash flows hold relatively more cash and cash equivalents – scaled by 
total assets less cash. Firms with greater access to the capital market are more likely to hold 
lower ratios of cash. Firms that do well were also found to have a tendency to accumulate 
more liquidity (cash) according to this well-known paper. 
In the same year 1999, Harford approached a sample of acquisition attempts by US firms 
between 1977 and 1993 and found evidence supporting the free cash flow theory’s agency 
costs, which provides an explanation for why cash-rich firms in the sample were found to 
be more likely to attempt acquisitions than the others.  
At a more international level, Dittmar et al (2003) worked on a sample of over 11,000 
firms from 45 countries and found that firms in countries with low protection of 
shareholder rights retain cash up to twice as much as firms in countries with better 
shareholder rights protection do. The findings from the research also imply a less important 
role of such factors as investment opportunities and information asymmetry, which would 
normally drive the demand for holding cash, where shareholders rights protection is quite 
low. 
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Ferreira and Vilela (2004) collected a sample of 400 firms in 12 Economic and Monetary 
Union nations from 1987 to 2000 in evaluate how corporate cash holdings are determined. 
Results show a positive relationship between investment opportunity sets, cash flows and 
cash holdings; while assets’ liquidity, leverage ratio and firm size are negatively related to 
cash holdings. Bank debt is also negatively related to cash holdings, which implies that a 
close relationship with banks allows firms to be less precautionary in holding cash. Firms 
with greater investor protection and highly concentrated ownership tend to hold less cash, 
supporting the theory of agency costs of managerial discretion in explaining levels of cash 
holdings. These results are supported by findings in Dittmar et al. (2003) but do not 
confirm the evidence in Dittmar’s work (2003)  that capital markets development level can 
positively impact cash holdings. EMU firms in more developed capital markets are found 
to hold less cash, which means a contrast to the agency cost view. 
A paper on the institutional context as a driving force of liquidity holdings by Elion Jani, 
Martin Hoesli and Andre Bender (2004) for the Swiss market from 1990 to 2000 has a 
focus on the impact of ownership concentration, voting rights, growth prospects, and 
information asymmetries. Swiss firms are characterized by high cash holdings and 
concentrated ownership while minority investors are poorly protected. The work gives 
evidence supporting both trade off and pecking order theories. Firms with different voting 
right shares tend to adjust less quickly than firms having one simple and unique structure 
of voting right. 
With more focus on why firms hold cash at industry level, Kim et al. (2011) studied 125 
publicly-trade US restaurant firms from 1997 to 2008 and stated that restaurant firms with 
greater investment opportunities are likely to hold a higher level of cash balance. 
Meanwhile, there are results suggesting that large restaurant firms, firms with high amount 
of cash substitution assets and firms incurring high capital expenditures, and firms paying 
more dividends hold less. In this paper both precautionary and transaction motives are 
described to play an important role in explaining cash holdings for these firms. 
This paper’s last literature review of cash holdings’ studies in developed markets will 
address a recent study on cash holdings’ determinants to find evidence from Canada 
(Charul Shah, 2012). A study on 166 Canadian firms listed on Toronto Stock Exchange 
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between 2008 and 2010 showed support for the role of agency problems in determining 
corporate cash holdings.  
In short, most of the studies in the field have been dedicated to countries or groups of 
countries in the developed markets and most of them found support for the framework 
theories of tradeoff and pecking order. Firm characteristics such as firm size, growth 
prospects, leverage, and net working capital have been substantially examined, with results 
about their impact on cash holdings relatively consistent with each other. However, another 
important determinant that has been drawing more and more attraction from researchers, 
corporate governance (represented by ownership structure, shareholding dispersion, and 
level of shareholders’ right protection) remains different or even contradicts in its impact 
on cash holding issue among studies focusing on agency costs as an important factor. 
Nevertheless, in general, most of the findings imply an important role of agency costs in 
corporate cash holdings; and firms with better institutional quality, e.g. good shareholder 
protection, are more likely to hold less cash than firms with poorer corporate governance. 
2.2.2. Cash holding in emerging markets 
Discussion of firms in countries in emerging markets will have different setting, especially 
from the institutional perspective. Many listed firms in emerging markets are state-owned, 
as in China (Al-Najjar, 2013) as well as in Vietnam (Nguyen and Ramachadran, 2006). 
Corporate governance is still a new concept in many of these countries as a majority of 
them have just passed or are still in the middle of the transitional stage of economy to 
become market-oriented. That is why it is necessary there be an investigation into these 
countries, especially when finance and its corporate applications are new topics 
themselves, compared to other aspects of business. 
And yet cash holding and its determination is given attention even later, since in the 
previous literature not many studies was dedicated to cash holdings in emergent markets 
until fewer than 10 years before the writing of this paper. There have been studies on this 
topic in emerging countries across Asia (China, Pakistan, Turkey, India, Vietnam, etc.), 
South American (mainly Brazil) and Africa (Nigeria, for example). This paper will focus 
more on literature for Vietnam and countries of similar characteristics, which are mostly in 
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south-east Asia. This is to eventually establish relevant empirical evidence in a consistent 
market characteristics setting.  
A paper on cash holdings determination for the Chinese market by Megginson and Wei 
(2010) presents a study on the relationship between state-ownership and cash holdings 
from 1993 to 2007. The study suggests agency problems in state-controlled firms, which 
accounts for a lower value of their cash holdings. In addition, the study finds evidence for a 
positive association between cash holdings and firm size, profitability and growth 
opportunities. Cash holding is found in the research to be negatively affected by leverage 
and net working capital. 
Another paper on a group of developing markets, but on an international level, is carried 
out by Al-Najjar (2013) to explore corporate cash holdings in Brazil, Russia, India and 
China in terms of cash holding determination under the impact of firm characteristic and 
corporate governance. The results suggest that emerging markets differ from developed 
market in financial and governance structures but share similar patterns in cash holding’s 
determination and management behaviors. 
For Vietnamese market, Thieu (2013) examined the determinants of cash holding for 
manufacturing firms between 2006 and 2011 with the application of the three framework 
theories tradeoff, pecking order and agency costs. To the best of my knowledge, this is the 
only paper working on cash holdings and their determinants in Vietnam so far. However, 
this paper simply focuses on the impact of firm characteristics and does not concern target 
cash holdings and it uses a simple regression for the static panel data model. There is 
support from the paper for negative impact of bank debt, leverage and asset liquidity on 
cash holding levels. Dividend payments, firm sizes and cash flows are positively related to 
cash holdings. In addition, managerial ownership is found to have little impact on the 
decisions of cash holdings. Therefore the research proposes a view that agency problem is 
less important in Vietnam than it is in developed countries like US and UK.  
Despite of its limited presence in previous literature, more research on the emerging 
market can be found in the previous literature of the field, e.g. research by Ogundipe et al. 
(2012) for Nigeria, Anand (2012) for India. Most of them simply investigated cash 
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holdings’ firm-specific determinants using Opler’s model (1999) to seek evidence from 
those countries. Another one which looks further into agency problems in addition to the 
determinants’ examination in Pakistan is the work by Afza and Adnan (2007). Findings of 
this study are consistent with previous work in developed countries regarding the impact of 
firm characteristics.   
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III. HYPOTHESES, DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
 
1. Hypotheses 
In this section hypotheses are developed with discussion of firm characteristics in relation to 
cash holding which includes leverage, growth opportunity, size, profitability, liquidity, 
investment in tangible assets, net working capital, free cash flow and dividend policy. These 
are widely observed and frequently researched determinants, as found in the discussed 
literature review. In addition, state-ownership is also included to reflect the country-specific 
impact on corporate cash holdings in Vietnam. 
a. Leverage. The fact that most Vietnamese firms rely on short-term borrowings, found in 
many researches on capital structure in Vietnam (Nguyen and Ramachadran, 2006), 
suggests that firms in Vietnam tend to use short-term debts as a substitute for holding 
cash (John, 1993). This negative relationship is proved in the works of Hardin (2009) for 
the US market. The same results are also found in researches on emerging market by 
Afza and Adnan (2007), Rizwan and Javed (2011), both of which are for Pakistani firms, 
and by Megginson and Wei (2010) for Chinese market. 
H1. Ceteris-paribus, there is a negative relationship between leverage and cash holdings. 
 
b. Growth opportunity. As discussed above in the chapter of literature review, the pecking 
order theory leads to the implication that firms with strong growth opportunities avoid the 
costs of underinvestment and of financial distress so such firms are likely to maintain 
high balances of cash for reason of precaution. However, according to the free cash flow 
theory, firms with less growth opportunities are also likely to have high cash balances as 
entrenched managers keep cash to pursue their own interests.   
So far there have been some empirical studies supporting the first view, as found by 
Opler et. al (1999) for the US, Kim et al (2011) for American restaurants and Ferreira and 
Vilela (2004) for Economic and Monetary Union nations. Nguyen (2013), working on 
manufacturing firms in Vietnam, found a positive relationship between MTB ratio and 
cash holdings. That was also found, but with less significance, by Ogundipe et al (2012) 
for Nigerian firms. 
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H2. Ceteris-paribus, cash holdings are positively affected by growth opportunities. 
 
c. Size. A major proportion of Vietnamese firms are SMEs and they are found to have low 
level of liquidity but high level of leverage (Nguyen and Ramachadran, 2006). Nguyen 
(2013) found that large firms in Vietnam hold their cash tightly to maintain the large 
scale of their focused business. Smaller, and growing, firms tend to have low cash 
balances as most of their operating profit is turned into re-investment and re-financing 
because asymmetric information makes it more difficult for small-sized firms to raise 
external funds for new projects. In this case, firm size is a proxy for information 
asymmetry (Ozkan and Ozkan, 2004). 
H3.  Ceteris-paribus, there is a positive relationship between firm size and cash holdings. 
 
d. Profitability. Firms with high profitability are likely to stockpile cash as retained earnings 
rather than pay it as dividends to stockholders. According to Opler et al. (2009), firms 
doing well tend to accumulate cash. The pecking order theory supports this view as 
profitable firms, as especially small ones in Vietnam in the discussion above, may prefer 
to retain cash for re-financing their operations in the context of high information 
asymmetry. Agency costs problem, which is one of the outstanding imperfections in 
emerging markets, can also mean entrenched managers retain cash as part of operating 
profit to pursue their own projects.  
H4. Ceteris-paribus, there is a positive association between profitability and cash 
holdings.e  
 
e. Liquidity. Liquidity is measured as one of the predictors since liquid assets is an 
important substitution for cash. Liquid assets can be converted into cash with less cost 
than other assets. Therefore, firms with possession of high level of liquid assets are 
expected to be less reliable on cash. This is consistent with suggestions of trade-off 
theory. Based on this, Ferreira and Vilela (2004) argue that liquid assets can be easily 
turned into cash; hence they play as substitutes for cash. 
H5. Ceteris-paribus, there is an inverse relationship between assets liquidity and cash 
holdings. 
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f. Investment in fixed assets. Asset tangibility is also a researched determinant found in 
previous literature of the field. Negative relationship between corporate cash holdings 
and asset tangibility is found by Drobetz and Gruninger (2007). 
H6. Ceteris-paribus, there is an inverse relationship between investment in fixed assets 
and cash holdings. 
 
g. Free cash flow. The fact that internally generated funds should be firms’ first choice of 
financing, under the pecking order theory, suggests that firms have a tendency to increase 
their reserve of cash whenever it is possible for them to do so (Opler et al, 1999). Hence, 
all other factors remaining unchanged, the larger the amount of free cash flow, the larger 
the amount of cash reserves.  
H7. Ceteris-paribus, cash flow and cash holdings are positively related. 
 
h. Capital expenditure. Under the pecking order theory, there is a negative relationship 
between capital expenditure and corporate cash holdings. A large amount of capital 
expenditures is expected to drain out cash balances. In addition, since these spending 
mean more assets that may serve as collateral for borrowings, debt capacity is greater in 
this case. This, in turn, will result in less demand for cash. This is supported by Bates et 
al. (2009), who finds a negative association between cash holdings and capital 
expenditures.   
H8. Ceteris-paribus, capital expenditures and cash holdings are negatively related. 
 
i. Dividend payout. Another substitution of holding cash is paying dividends. Firms can 
decrease their dividend payments in the event of cash shortfall. Negative relationship 
between dividend payout and cash holdings is suggested by Opler et al. (1999). However, 
in order to maintain the level of dividend payments, firms that historically pay dividend 
are also expected to maintain higher cash balance than firms that do not pay out as 
dividend. As a result, a positive relationship probably exists between dividend payout and 
cash holdings. Therefore, no certain prediction is given here but dividend payout is 
included in the regression as a dummy variable. 
 
j. State ownership. The work on capital structure of Vietnamese firms by Nguyen and 
Ramachadran (2006) shows a large presentation of state-owned companies in the sample 
of Vietnamese SMEs and finds a strong link between those firms with high level of bank 
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debts due to networking and relationship between management and commercial banks. 
The high proportion of bank debts in state-owned firms in Vietnam suggests a low level 
of cash holdings by those firms, as suggested by this work, because a large proportion of 
those bank debts is short-term so there is an insignificant reliance on cash holdings for 
those firms. However, state-owned firms in emerging market are also where agency costs 
(entrenched management) can become significant as they are strongly protected and 
guaranteed by the governments. This positive relationship – state-owned firms hold more 
cash – is found for Chinese firms by Megginson and Wei (2010). State ownership is also 
measured in the regression as a dummy. 
 
2. Data: Collecting and handling process 
2.1 Sampling 
Since Vietnamese market is still in the developing stage, which results in the significance of 
the market imperfections, sampling frame is an important procedure in the process of data 
collection. A perfect correspondence between the sampling frame and the target population is 
rarely found; but the former represents the target population (Nguyen, 2006). Ho Chi Minh 
City and the capital Hanoi represent the most important economic areas for the south and the 
north of the country, respectively. So to test the hypotheses developed above, only 
Vietnamese firms listed on the stock exchanges of Ho Chi Minh City (HOSE) and Hanoi 
(HSE) are included in the investigation. 
 
2.2 Investigated period 
Information is collected for the period from 2010 to 2013 due to a high level of data missing 
by 2010. The years within this period are when the stock market in Vietnam is better 
developed and information for the period is more meaningful because of improvement in 
market imperfections. It is also a favourable period to investigate in order to have an 
evaluation of how Vietnamese market is performing since the implementation of ‘Doi Moi’ 
by the government in 1986, a policy to transform Vietnamese market from a centrally-
planned to a market-oriented economy.  
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2.3 Collection and handling process 
Data is collected from Bloomberg database and handled in Excel for test preparation. 
Financial firms are excluded because of their inventories of marketable securities under cash 
item account. These financial firms are also required to meet statutory capital requirement 
levels. Also excluded are utilities firms because they are supervised and regulated by the 
government. Firms with negative revenues are not included. The selection process gives out a 
sample of 107 firms from the original sample of approximately 200 firms, with 33 state-
owned firms (SOE). Firms are across various sectors such as basic material, consumer goods, 
health care, oil and gas, technology and telecommunications, under ICB classification. From 
the narrowed list of 107 firms with information available from the 4-year period, a panel data 
of 302 firm-year observations is constructed for the regression. 
 
3. Variable measurements 
Most of the proxies for the determinants discussed earlier are employed in previous research 
of determinants of cash holdings. Deflation for most financial figures is non-cash total assets 
at book value since a firm’s ability to create profits in the future should be a function of its 
assets in place (Opler et al., 1999). 
a. Cash holdings. Cash holdings level is measured as cash and marketable securities in 
proportion to the non-cash total assets. 
b. Growth opportunities. Since growth prospects are represented by the likelihood of net 
present value (NPV) projects and growth options are not presented in book value of 
assets, market-to-book ratio is taken as a proxy for measuring firms’ growth 
opportunities. 
c. Firm size. This is measured as the natural logarithm of the book value of total assets. 
d. Leverage.  Debt-to-assets ratio is used to measure level of firm leverage. 
e. Dividend payouts. A dummy set to one for years where a dividend payment is recorded; 
otherwise, the dummy is zero. 
f. Cash flow. Cash flow input in the regression is free cash flow for the year, deflated by 
non-cash total assets. 
 
 
24 
 
g. Investment in fixed assets. This is measured as a ratio of investment in tangible assets to 
non-cash total assets. 
h. Profitability. Return on assets (ROA) is chosen to measure firm profitability. 
i. Liquidity. This is measured by using non-cash net working capital, deflated by the non-
cash total assets. 
j. Capital expenditure. Capital expenditure is measured against non-cash total assets. 
k. State ownership. The effect of state ownership is measured by an input of a dummy 
variable, setting to one if the firm is defined as an SOE with state owning more than 50% 
of the shares. Otherwise, the variable equals zero. 
A summary of the description of these variables and their relationships with cash holdings as 
discussed in the developed hypotheses is represented in table I. Note that assets in the 
denominators are book value of total assets less cash and cash equivalent, for the purpose of 
scaling and deflating the figures. 
Table I. Measurements of cash holding and its determinant variables; and their relationship hypotheses 
Variables Model input Proxies for measurement 
Relationship 
hypotheses 
Cash holdings CASH Cash and cash equivalent/assets - 
Liquidity LIQ (Net working capital – cash and cash equivalent)/ assets Negative 
Profitability PROF Operating profit/ assets (ROA) Positive 
Tangibility TANG Tangible assets/assets Negative 
Growth opportunities GROWTH 
(Book value of assets - Book value of equity + Market 
value of equity)/ Book value of assets 
Positive 
Size SIZE Natural logarithm of total assets Positive 
Leverage LEV Total debts/ assets Negative 
Cash flow CFLOW Free cash flow/ assets Positive 
Capital expenditures CAPEX Capital expenditure/ assets Negative 
Dividend payout DIV 1 if dividend paid; 0 if no dividend paid - 
State-ownership SOE 1 if % state ownership > 0.5; 0 if state ownership < 0.5 - 
 
4. Regression model and method 
4.1 General model  
Based on the development of the hypotheses and the measurements of the determinants 
discussed earlier, the general form of the static model of cash holdings is as follows: 
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𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 +  𝛽1𝐶𝐹𝐿𝑂𝑊𝑖𝑡 −  𝛽2𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑖𝑡 − 𝛽3𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽4𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽5𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡 −  𝛽6𝐷𝐼𝑉𝑖𝑡 +
 𝛽7𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐹𝑖𝑡 −  𝛽8𝑇𝐴𝑁𝐺𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽9𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐸𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽10𝑆𝑂𝐸𝑖𝑡 + ԑ𝑖𝑡  
where firms are represented by i = 1,..., N and time by t = 1,..., T. 𝛼𝑖  represents the intercept 
of the model and ԑ𝑖𝑡  refers to regression errors.  
4.2 Method overview 
Multiple regression is carried out on the model with cash being the dependent variable. The 
regression employs Generalized linear modelling technique (Ordinary least squares method). 
OLS multiple regression analysis contributes to exploring the extent to which the variability 
of the dependent variable is explained by a group of predictors. Under this method, critical 
evaluation and interpretation of the following main output is normally required for: 
(1) Variable coefficient (𝛽1, 𝛽2,...). The coefficient of an explanatory variable describes 
the variance in independent variable that is related to a unit change in that explanatory 
variable. 
(2) The fit of the model (R-square). R-square represents the proportion of the variability 
of the independent variable that is accounted for by the changes in the explanatory 
variables included in the model 
(3) Significance of the model (F-statistic). Analysis of the variance (ANOVA) is also 
important in evaluating how well the model fits the data. The F-statistic is used for 
ANOVA analysis, demonstrating the overall significance of the model. 
In addition, it is necessary that the principle assumptions for the regression about (i) 
relationship linearity, (ii) residual independence, (iii) homoscedasticity of the variance and 
(iv) normal distribution of the errors be not violated for the results not to be biased and 
misleading, especially when economic implications are made.  
4.3 Regression of the model 
Based on the overall discussion of OLS method above, the model proposed earlier for this 
paper is regressed for a cross-sectional analysis of 302 firm-year observations.  
Also included in the regression analysis process are additional regressions for industry sector 
sub-samples. An analysis of the results is dedicated to each of the industry sectors in both 
economic and institutional context. This is with an aim to give the analysis more insight into 
cash holdings in relation to industry-specific characteristics and to state ownership for firms 
in Vietnamese emerging market. 
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The tool employed is a combination of Excel and SPSS package for regression functions and 
presentation purposes. 
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IV. RESULTS 
 
1. Descriptive statistics 
In this section, cross sectional panels are constructed to demonstrate how average values 
move chronologically and differ across various industries. One of the panels is also dedicated 
to a comparison between SOEs and private firms in terms of cash holdings and firm-specific 
characteristics. 
 
1.1 Time series, industry averages and sample overview 
 
Table II illustrates the averages for cash holdings and its firm-specific determinants for all 
firm-year observations. Averages are also shown over the investigated period and across 
various industry sectors. 
As seen in panel A, overall, Vietnamese firms in the sample hold cash at about 8.4% on 
average, which represents an insignificant difference from the average level 9.9% found by 
Nguyen (2013) for Vietnamese manufacturing firms. The maximum level detected of cash 
holdings for this Vietnamese sample, about 40%, is much lower than that for UK 
firms(Ozkan, 2002), which is about 96.7%. 
Chronologically, what is noticeable is the simultaneous, sharp decrease in cash holdings, 
growth prospects (MTB), liquidity (NWC) and profitability (ROA) for the first two years of 
the investigated period (2010-2011), as seen in Panel B of the same table. The most 
significant change can be observed in the level of cash holdings and liquidity in 2011, with 
the ratios decreasing by 27% for cash holdings while liquidity plunged by 93%. These 
downward changes in liquidity holdings, market-to-book and profitability ratios can be 
explained by the negative impact exerted by the financial crisis that officially spread 
worldwide in 2009-2010. Profitability and liquidity does not improve in 2012 despite an 
upward, but insignificant trend in the level of cash holdings and growth opportunities. By 
way of justifying those downward changes in liquidity and profitability from 2010 to 2012, 
there is an increase in the level of gearing and tangibility for the same period. The 
observation of these opposite changes is consistent with the inverse association between 
leverage and liquidity levels found in many previous works in the field regardless of whether 
it is research on developed or emerging markets. Averages for the most recent year of the 
investigated period, 2013, shows positive changes in most averages, including profitability, 
cash holdings, cash flow, growth opportunities, liquidity and tangible. Meanwhile, average 
leverage level for this year goes down (by 10%), which is again explainable in the same 
fashion discussed earlier. 
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Table II. Time series, averages and descriptive statistics 
 
CASH SIZE MTB LIQ LEV CFLOW TANG ROA CAPEX
Mean 0.084 26.958 1.055 0.334 0.309 0.004 0.345 0.101 0.070
Standard Deviation 0.085 1.618 0.678 1.729 0.188 0.178 0.219 0.085 0.079
Minimum 0 20.47 0.26 -2.53 0 -0.36 0 -0.2 0.000
Maximum 0.4 31.44 7.18 20.66 0.86 1.15 0.92 0.48 0.385
Years CASH SIZE MTB LIQ LEV CFLOW TANG ROA CAPEX
2010 0.094 26.758 1.243 1.151 0.282 -0.020 0.308 0.119 0.074
2011 0.069 26.932 0.928 0.081 0.322 -0.016 0.354 0.101 0.090
2012 0.077 27.023 0.976 0.060 0.329 0.022 0.350 0.090 0.061
2013 0.103 27.139 1.109 0.064 0.295 0.033 0.371 0.096 0.052
Sector CASH SIZE MTB LIQ LEV CFLOW TANG ROA CAPEX
Basic Materials 0.062 27.198 1.095 0.088 0.352 -0.020 0.392 0.099 0.079
Health Care 0.095 26.479 1.126 0.548 0.252 0.057 0.278 0.127 0.064
Oil & Gas 0.158 26.876 0.983 1.139 0.279 0.040 0.348 0.120 0.077
Technology 0.099 26.415 0.860 0.587 0.228 -0.005 0.209 0.053 0.031
Telecommunications 0.150 26.962 0.821 0.124 0.153 0.088 0.231 0.082 0.029
Panel A: descriptive statistics (all firm-years)
Panel C: average values by industry sector
Panel B: average values by year
 
 
In terms of industry sector, cash holdings averages are highest for Oil & gas and 
Telecommunications sectors being 15.8% and 15%, respectively. Their differences from the 
sample averages (8.4%) are relatively significant as they are nearly twice higher. 
Interestingly, these are sectors of which most firms are state-owned and partly state-
regulated. Hence, this can be a signal for potential positive relationship between state 
ownership and cash holdings. Evidence supporting this relationship is found by Megginson 
and Wei (2010) for Chinese firms. Corresponding to those high average levels of cash 
holdings, leverage levels for these two sectors are much lower than those for the other 
sectors, which again may exhibit the inverse relationship between cash holdings and 
leverage. Also remarkable is growth prospects for firms of these sectors since they have the 
lowest averages in the group, which may lead to contradicting what is found between growth 
prospects and cash holdings in developed markets, but confirming the discussion earlier of 
the hypothesis between MTB ratio and cash holdings under the impact of agency costs 
problem (due to state ownership). Cash flows averages for these sectors are also among the 
highest of the group. 
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1.2 Cash holding and its variables: SOEs and private firms 
Table III illustrates the descriptive statistics for SOE and non-SOE, for the purpose of 
comparison.  
As expected, on average, SOEs hold more cash, as well as debts, than non-SOEs. As 
discussed earlier, agency costs in SOEs can be significant and mean more cash in the 
balances. At the same time, historically, SOEs in Vietnam are more able to obtain debts from 
commercial banks in the country (Nguyen and Ramachadran, 2006) than private firms, which 
justifies the higher level in averages of debts of SOEs than the others. SOEs are also bigger 
in size on average; and have more investment in tangible assets. However, despite the higher 
level in cash holdings, the averages do not exhibit a higher level of growth opportunities for 
SOEs: Vietnamese non-SOEs have better MTB ratio on average. In addition, the maximum 
MTB ratio for non-SOEs is as high as 7.18, compared to a merely 2.23 for SOEs. Noticeably, 
Vietnamese non-SOEs are also higher in terms of maximum level of profitability with 8% 
difference (at 48%). SOEs, which are mainly composed of by oil & gas and 
telecommunications firms, have higher level of capital expenditure. 
 
Table IIII. Descriptive statistics for SOE and non-SOE: cash and its determinants 
 
Non-SOE SOE Non-SOE SOE Non-SOE SOE Non-SOE SOE Non-SOE SOE
Mean 0.083 0.088 26.904 27.066 1.100 0.964 0.270 0.463 0.304 0.320
Standard Deviation 0.081 0.093 1.474 1.878 0.799 0.302 1.274 2.403 0.187 0.191
Minimum 0.000 0.000 23.640 20.470 0.260 0.330 -2.530 -0.300 0.000 0.010
Maximum 0.340 0.400 30.500 31.440 7.180 2.230 12.780 20.660 0.670 0.860
Non-SOE SOE Non-SOE SOE Non-SOE SOE Non-SOE SOE
Mean 0.001 0.011 0.310 0.415 0.099 0.105 0.064 0.082
Standard Deviation 0.191 0.147 0.198 0.243 0.087 0.081 0.074 0.088
Minimum -0.360 -0.270 0.000 0.020 -0.200 -0.150 0.000 0.000
Maximum 1.150 0.510 0.810 0.920 0.480 0.400 0.385 0.385
CFLOW TANG ROA CAPEX
CASH SIZE MTB LIQ LEV
 
 
To sum up, statistically Vietnamese SOEs are bigger in size, have higher level of capital 
expenditure, hold more cash and liquidity, obtain more debts and have more free cash flow 
compared to private firms. However, these private firms in Vietnam seem to fare better in 
getting higher return on assets and have stronger growth opportunities than SOEs in the same 
country. 
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1.3 Correlation analysis 
Investigation of correlation is a critical quantitative measure of relationship among variables. 
Variables’ correlation (r) lies between -1 and 1, with positive values indicating a positive 
correlation between variables and negative values indicating a negative correlation. The 
larger the positive values, the stronger the positive correlation, and vice versa. Perfect 
positive (negative) correlation occurs when values of r equals 1 (-1). There is no correlation 
if r = 0.  
A correlation matrix illustrating how all variables are correlated in pair is constructed as 
below. 
Table IV. Correlation matrix 
CASH SIZE MTB LIQ DIV SOE LEV CFLOW TANG ROA CAPEX
CASH 1
SIZE 0.108 1
MTB 0.116 0.128 1
LIQ 0.000 -0.334 0.047 1
DIV 0.076 0.108 -0.029 0.104 1
SOE 0.031 0.047 -0.095 0.053 0.192 1
LEV -0.281 0.320 -0.133 -0.019 0.024 0.041 1
CFLOW 0.269 -0.073 0.019 -0.014 0.052 0.027 -0.244 1
TANG -0.194 0.001 0.068 0.018 -0.059 0.226 0.120 -0.179 1
PROF 0.453 0.132 0.196 0.037 0.339 0.032 -0.076 0.227 -0.013 1
CAPEX -0.107 0.120 0.024 -0.010 0.124 0.109 0.150 -0.358 0.586 0.180 1 
 
Table IV presents correlation coefficient matrix of paired variables for the sample of this 
research.  
 
The results show a strong and positive relationship between cash holdings and 
profitability at 1% significance level, with r as high as 0.45 in absolute value. Cash 
holdings are also positively correlated in pair with cash flow, state-ownership, dividend 
payout, liquidity, growth opportunities and firm size at 1% significance level. A strong 
and negative association is found between cash holdings and asset tangibility, and cash 
holdings and gearing, with r being 0.28 and 0.19, respectively. Cash holdings also 
negatively correlate with CAPEX. 
 
Among other variables, strong and inverse correlation is found for liquidity and size, cash 
flow and CAPEX, dividend payout and profitability, CAPEX and cash flow. All of these 
pairs have r higher than 0.3 in absolute value. 
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As for the rest, what is remarkable is the strong and positive correlation between CAPEX 
and asset tangibility, and between gearing level and firm size. 
 
2. Estimation results 
 
In this section, results of OLS regression running on SPSS 20 software are discussed for all 
firm-year observations.  
 
2.1 Model fit and estimates overview 
Regression on the model gives a value of 34% for R-squared at 5% significance level, 
suggesting that 34% of the change in cash holding in Vietnamese firms is explained by the 
variability of the explanatory variables included in the model. The analysis of variance 
ANOVA tests, with F-statistics of 14.64%, are significant at 0.000. 
Table IIIa. Model summary for all firm-year observations
 
 
Table IIIb. ANOVA for all firm-year observations 
 
In addition, in order to give the regression results more reliability, it is important that the 
range of variance in residuals is acceptable, which should be around zero value. The 
acceptable range that is previously considered includes values that do not exceed +/-3 (Med 
J, 2010). Accordingly, the maximum value for standardized residuals from the regression in 
this paper is 2.694 and the minimum value being -1.814, as seen in Figure 1 below. 
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Figure 1. Standardized residuals graph 
From the computed OLS estimates, the general form of the regression equation can be 
rewritten as below: 
CASH = -0.12 + 0.008*SIZE – 0.001*MTB + 0.001*LIQ -1.116*LEV + 0.038*CFLOW -           
0.055*TANG + 0.435*PROF -0.057*CAPEX + 0.014*SOE – 0.018DIV + RESIDUAL 
The computed estimates for independent variables confirm predicted signs of most of the 
hypotheses: 
 
H1. Ceteris-paribus, there is a negative relationship between leverage and cash holdings. 
H3.  Ceteris-paribus, there is a positive relationship between firm size and cash holdings. 
H4. Ceteris-paribus, there is a positive association between profitability and cash 
holdings. 
H6. Ceteris-paribus, there is an inverse relationship between investment in fixed assets 
and cash holdings. 
H7. Ceteris-paribus, cash flow and cash holdings are positively related. 
H8. Ceteris-paribus, capital expenditures and cash holdings are negatively related. 
The computed estimates for independent variables do not confirm predicted signs of the 
hypotheses below: 
H2. Ceteris-paribus, cash holdings are positively affected by growth opportunities. 
H5. Ceteris-paribus, there is an inverse relationship between assets liquidity and cash 
holdings. 
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The next discussions will shed more light on these results of the model regression, with 
discussions separated by groups of determinants regarding the extent of their influence on 
cash holdings for the sample. 
 
2.2 Firm size and profitability 
 
Statistically, firm size and profitability have a significantly positive impact on corporate cash 
holdings in Vietnam. This confirms hypotheses H3 and H4.  
 
In particular, profitability has a significant coefficient value as high as 0.435. This result is 
strongly supported by the pecking order theory as discussed above. Some researches on the 
developed markets, including Tokyo (Nguyen P., 2005) and the US (Opler et al., 1999), 
confirm this relationship. This positive relationship between profitability and corporate cash 
holdings is also established by evidence from Nigeria (Ogundipe et al., 2012) and China 
(Megginson and Wei, 2010). Hence, in specific cases of emerging markets, operating profits 
can be considered as a favourable source of internal funds for re-financing and re-investment, 
in the context where the agency costs of debts are higher due to pronounced existence of 
information asymmetry in these markets, as also discussed earlier. Another possible 
explanation can be derived from free cash flow theory of Jensen (1986) which depicts agency 
costs of managerial discretion. This type of agency costs implies excess cash retained by 
entrenched management in order to pursue their own projects of interest.  
 
As for firm size, its positive association with cash holdings is predicted in consistency with 
many findings in previous literature for both developed markets and emerging markets 
(Opler et al., 1999; Afza and Adnan, 2007; Megginson and Wei, 2010; Ogundipe et al., 
2012). Thieu (2013) also found the same result for firm size as a positive determinant on cash 
holdings by manufacturing firms in Vietnam. 
 
2.3 Liquidity, state ownership and cash flow availability 
 
Positive impact, but with level of significance by t-statistics value, is found for liquidity 
(contradicting hypothesis H5), state ownership and cash flow availability (supporting 
hypothesis H7).  
 
Liquidity’s positive relationship with cash flow in this research exhibits a difference from 
results found for developed market (Opler et al., 1999, Ferreira and Vilela, 2004, Kim et al., 
2011) as well as for emerging markets (Afza and Adnan, 2007; Megginson and Wei, 2010; 
Ogundipe et al., 2012; Rizwan and Javed, 2011; Thieu, 2013). Nevertheless, the impact is 
insignificant with t-statistics as low as 0.827. 
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As for state ownership its positive impact on cash holdings is consistent with results found 
for Chinese firms (Megginson and Wei, 2010).  
 
Positive result for cash flow confirms suggestions under free cash flow and pecking order 
theories when cash is retained for precautionary caution or for management’s own interests. 
This positive relationship of cash flow and cash holdings is strongly supported by empirical 
studies for different markets.  
 
It should be noted that these impacts are also insignificant at low t-statistics values found in 
the output. 
 
2.4 Leverage, asset tangibility and dividend payout 
 
The output shows leverage, asset tangibility and dividend payout as strong determinants on 
cash holdings, negative in coefficient signs and statistically significant in explanatory power. 
 
Among these determinants, leverage demonstrates a strong negative impact on cash holdings  
for Vietnamese firms. This is consistent with largely found evidence from both developed 
and capital market (Opler et al., 1999, Ferreira and Vilela, 2004; Afza and Adnan, 2007; 
Megginson and Wei, 2010; Ogundipe et al., 2012; Rizwan and Javed, 2011; Thieu, 2013). 
According to Baskin (1987) and Ozkan (2002), the higher the gearing ratio, the lower the 
cash holdings firms have. In addition, this negative association is theoretically consistent 
with suggestions from both trade-off and pecking order models. 
 
Asset tangibility, as a determinant, is negatively associated with corporate cash holdings in 
Vietnam. This determinant also demonstrates a good power of explanation with a relatively 
high t-statistics value. This result may imply the important role of asset tangibility as 
favourable collateral for debt raising; hence firms with high level of investment in fixed 
assets are likely to shift some of its dependence from cash holdings as they are expected to 
borrow more easily against their tangible assets. The paper on Nigerian market by Ogundipe 
et al. (2012) supports this view and gives evidence for this negative relationship. 
 
As for dividend payout, which is a dummy variable input in the model, a negative association 
between this determinant and cash holdings is found from the output of the regression model. 
This finding can be evidence supporting the argument that dividend payout is one of cash 
holdings’ substitutions (Opler et al., 1999).  
 
These findings confirm hypotheses H1 and H6. 
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2.5 Growth opportunities and capital expenditures 
 
Results for MTB and CAPEX as determinants in the regression model suggest their negative 
impact on corporate cash holdings in Vietnam, at a low level of significance. 
 
The negative relationship between MTB ratio and cash holdings level is contrary to what is 
found from previous researches (contradicting hypothesis H2). As discussed earlier, MTB 
ratio as a reflection of growth opportunities may not be relevant for the purpose in the 
context of an underdeveloped stock market in Vietnam since the proxy ratio could get less 
reliable due to imperfections of the market. Noted that its coefficient is at a low value (-
0.001) and t-statistics is quite small in absolute value (0.167). Therefore, the negative 
association of this ratio with cash holdings for this sample does not necessarily reflect the 
negative relationship between growth prospects and cash holdings of firms in realistic. 
 
Even though the significance level for CAPEX coefficient is also low, its negative sign 
supports the view that large spending of capital expenditures may result in cash balances 
drained out. This negative association is also explicable in the way that higher level of capital 
expenditures leads to higher availability of assets which in turn can effectively serve as 
collateral against borrowings. Reliance on cash holdings is less pronounced as a result. This 
supports hypothesis H5.  
 
Below is the summary of the findings discussed above. 
Table IV. Estimates summary 
 
Positive Negative 
Significant Firm size 
Profitability (ROA) 
 
Leverage 
Asset tangibility 
Dividend payout 
Insignificant 
Liquidity (NWC) 
State-ownership  
Cash flow 
Growth opportunities (MTB) 
Capital expenditures (CAPEX) 
 
3. Assumptions testing 
 
In order to ensure that there is no serious bias or misleading in the fit of the model, the 
confidence intervals, and consequently, economic implications, it is critical that relevant tests 
be carried out to check if there is any violation in the principle assumptions: 
 
i. Relationship between dependent and its predictors is linear. 
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ii. There is no serial correlation among the residuals, i.e. independence of the residuals 
iii. Variance of the errors is constant, namely homoscedasticity, against time or against 
any independent variable 
iv. The distribution of the errors is normal. 
 
3.1 Multicollinearity test 
Multicollinearity occurs when independent variables are co-linear and can make multiple 
regression results paradoxical. In some cases, results show a high F-test that indicate good fit 
of the model although none of the predictors has a statistically significant impact on 
explaining the dependent variable.  
One way to check this statistical issue is to look at the correlation matrix, as constructed 
earlier. Most absolute values of correlations between the variables are well below 0.5, except 
for correlation between CAPEX and asset tangibility which is slightly higher than 0.5. This 
supports linearity assumption for the regression model. 
However, in addition to co-linearity between one variable with another, it is also possible that 
there is co-linearity between one variable and a combination of the other variables. In order 
to detect this problem, a measure for tolerance is employed by the variance inflation factor 
(VIF) which is reciprocal to tolerance. 
 
Tolerance value lies within the range from 0 to 1. A tolerance value that is near 0 indicates 
the existence of a linear combination of other variables. Therefore the acceptable tolerance 
range is between 0.5 and 1. As for the VIF, acceptable range includes values smaller than 2. 
 
Below is a table for the independent variables and their VIFs and tolerance computed using 
SPSS. 
Table V. Tolerance and VIF measure 
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As seen from this table, all the tolerance values are well above 0.5 while all VIF values 
are smaller than 2 with the maximum value being 1.956. These values of both tolerance 
and VIF are acceptable. 
 
Together with the conclusion from the correlation matrix above, this test gives strong 
support to the assumption that there is no multicollinearity among the independent 
variables of this paper. 
 
3.2 Test for auto-correlation in the residuals 
Assumptions for model regression include the independence of errors from each other. 
Violation of this assumption is mainly detected for time-series data because data is collected 
for the same variables over time. In this case it is likely that errors for observations in 
consecutive time periods will be highly correlated with each other. In order to test for 
correlated residuals, one of the commonly used tools is Durbin-Watson statistic.  Durbin-
Watson statistic test returns values ranging from 0 to 4. Acceptable values from Durbin-
Watson statistic test are normally ones that are approximately 2.  
 
As can be seen from table IIIa for model summary, the Durbin-Watson statistic value for this 
model is 1.908, which lies in the acceptable range. This leads to the conclusion that there is 
no violation in the assumption of the independence of errors in the model regression. 
4. Industry analysis and state-ownership influence 
 
In addition to firm-specific determinants, industry characteristics are a source of influence on 
corporate cash holdings. According to Opler et al. (1999), cash holding varies across industry 
sectors. Therefore, for the purpose of specifically arguing economic implications for the 
investigated market, more insight is given into cash holding and its determinants for 
Vietnamese firms at industry level, with regression of the general model previously 
employed under OLS method. Analysis in this section covers regression results for the 
industry sectors covered in the sample with the exemption of telecommunications due to the 
insufficient number of observations for the regression. The industry sectors in question are 
basic materials, health care, oil and gas and technology. 
 
However, in the context of a SOE-dominated economy, it is critical that the analysis of the 
model results at industry level take place hand in hand with an evaluation of the impact 
exerted by state ownership structure. Imperfections in under-developed markets can imply a 
significant role of state ownership as a source of agency problems, which in turn can affect 
the level of cash holdings among firms. 
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The results from the model regression for different industries represent different pictures of 
cash holding in relation to its determinants. Evaluation of R-square and cash holdings under 
the effects of the determinants is discussed for each industry sector in the following sub-
sections. Implications under economic context as well as institutional context (structure of 
state ownership) are made in order to add meaning to the quantitative analysis.  
 
4.1 Basic material 
 
R-square value of 36% indicates 36% of the changes in cash holdings for firms in basic 
material markets is accounted for by the changes in the determinants. The signs of most 
variable coefficients in the regression output are consistent with the results found earlier for 
all sample, with profitability, leverage and CAPEX playing a significant role on cash holding 
determination for Vietnamese basic material firms. 
 
In particular, firm profitability is a positive determinant on cash holdings with a coefficient 
value as high as 0.438 and has a good explanatory power at less than 1% level of 
significance. The finding is consistent with the relationship found earlier for the whole 
sample and confirms the hypothesis H4. This solidifies evidence for the argument proposed 
in the hypothesis that the higher the operating profit the higher balance of cash is retained by 
firms. As cash is likely to be retained for re-financing operating activities in firms that have 
higher profitability, proposition of the pecking order theory applies in this case regarding 
financing hierarchy order. The fact that the majority of these firms are non-SOEs (71%) 
suggests their management’s preference of internal funds over external resources because of 
the agency costs of debts under information asymmetry in under-developed markets. 
 
Leverage and CAPEX exerts a negative impact on cash holdings for firms of this industry 
sector, confirming suggestions under the trade-off theory. 
 
Economically, basic material is one of the main contributors to reflecting the economic cycle 
of Vietnamese economy. This industry sector includes chemistry, forestry and paper, 
industrial metals and mining. The characteristics of these industries imply requirements for 
large investments in asset tangibility and CAPEX for operating activities. This matter of fact 
can contribute to the lowest average of cash holding by this sector (6.9%), since cash is 
retained when there is more profit coming and then re-injected into re-financing operations 
and re-investment in asset tangibility and CAPEX. The high requirements of re-financing and 
re-investments of this sector also mean more debts are likely to be acquired as cash balances 
get low. Positive but insignificant association between firm size and cash holdings for this 
sector suggests that larger firms will hold more cash due to the internally financing needs as 
discussed earlier. 
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4.2 Health care 
As seen from the result summary 54% of the changes in cash holdings for firms in health 
care sector is explained by the changes in the determinants. However, the results for 
coefficients and their signs as well as the level of significance do not resemble the results 
found earlier for the whole sample.  
Noticeably, findings for this sector reveal a positively significant relationship between 
growth opportunities and cash balances, which confirms evidence largely found in previous 
literature on different markets. Also consistent with evidence found in previous empirical 
studies is a negative (but insignificant) association between liquidity and cash holdings, even 
though this result is not in consistent with what found for all sample. Impact of leverage and 
profitability on cash holding of health care firms is the same with that of basic material firms, 
which is negative and positive, respectively, but insignificant. 
In the institutional context, health care firms in the sample represent only few SOEs (6%). 
This low presentation of SOEs in the sub-sample for this section can imply a justification for 
the positively significant relationship between growth opportunities and cash holdings since 
agency costs of managerial discretion is lower for non-SOEs. In addition, there is support for 
trade-off model in this case as the findings demonstrate an inverse relationship between cash 
holding with liquidity, with leverage and with dividend payouts. 
4.3 Oil and gas 
For oil and gas firms, R-square is relatively high with a value 79%. Some findings on the 
coefficients and their significance are consistent with those for the whole sample, with size, 
profitability, dividend playing a statistically significant role in determining cash holdings for 
firms in this sub-sample. 
Statistically, larger oil and gas firms hold more cash than the other firms. Firms with greater 
profitability tend to retain cash as well. Meanwhile, dividend payout is negatively related to 
cash holdings for firms in this sector. With low level of significance, growth opportunities 
and cash flow exert a positive impact on cash holding by these firms. All these findings show 
consistency with those found by Opler et al., 1999 for the US firms, which suggests that both 
trade-off and pecking-order theories strongly apply in this case. However, findings about 
cash holding’s relationship with its substitutes (leverage, asset tangibility and CAPEX) reveal 
a contradiction to the results found for the whole sample. More importantly, those findings 
also contradict the largely-found evidence on the relationship in previous literature. 
Economically, larger oil and gas firms tend to hold more cash on account of their larger scale 
of business. In terms of corporate governance, oil and gas sector in Vietnam is mainly under 
the control and regulation of the government. In this sub-sample, 91% of oil and gas firms 
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are state-owned. This can offer some argument for no findings found about the inverse 
relationship, between cash holding and its ‘substitutes’ (liquidity, leverage, asset tangibility 
investment and CAPEX) for Vietnamese firms in this sector, even though it is largely found 
in previous literature and also found in the regression on the whole sample. Moreover, this 
sector has the highest holding of cash among the investigated sectors, which is as high as 
15.8% on average, nearly doubling the average cash holding for the whole sample (8.4%). 
Consequently, these results may imply a significant existence of agency problems in these 
firms when it comes to the trade-off between costs and benefits of holding liquidity, which is 
normally expected to be a concern to management for the purpose of maximising 
stockholders’ value. 
4.4 Technology  
Quantitatively, R-square for this sector is 65%, which means a relatively high proportion of 
the change in cash holdings by firms in this sector explicable by the change in the 
investigated determinants. Significantly explanatory determinants found in the output include 
leverage level and state ownership with signs consistent with those found for the whole 
sample. 
Specifically, a negative association is detected between leverage and cash holding level for 
technology firms in Vietnam at 1% level of significance. At the same level of significance, 
state-ownership is also found to be negatively related to cash holding by these firms. Despite 
being found insignificant in explanatory power, signs for size (+), growth opportunities (-), 
asset tangibility (-), profitability (+) and CAPEX (-) are similar to those found earlier for all 
firm-year observations.  
Economically, business characteristics of technology firms require a lower level of 
investment in asset tangibility of CAPEX in comparison with other sectors under 
investigation. This economic view is statistically relevant since these firms have the highest 
average value of asset liquidity but the lowest average value of leverage, asset tangibility and 
CAPEX among the investigated sectors (except telecommunications), as seen in table II of 
descriptive statistics. These findings in turn lead to the suggestion that Vietnamese 
technology firms do not financially rely on external funds, because CAPEX and asset 
tangibility may be seen as a source of collateral availability for debt raising. This is somehow 
correlated to their low level of gearing. Moreover, the fact that only 15% of technology firms 
in the sample are SOEs means firms in this sector are less likely to approach external funds 
due to higher agency costs of debts under information asymmetry. Lastly, the sector has 
relatively high cash holding ratio (about 1% higher than the sample average) despite its much 
smaller indicator of investment set (MTB) and a less significant need for asset tangibility 
investment and CAPEX. As a result, it can be concluded that this sector relies more heavily 
on liquidity, including cash, rather than external funds. This conclusion, together with the 
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arguments above, gives support to the pecking order theory regarding the financing hierarchy 
model. 
In short, firm size, profitability and leverage are general powerful determinants for cash 
holding by firms in basic material, health care, oil and gas, and technology sectors in 
Vietnam. A large presentation of SOEs in the sector sample (like oil and gas) may result in 
significant agency costs of managerial discretion, implied by some contradiction in the 
findings for that sub-sample. In this case, no inverse relationship is found at all between cash 
holding and such substitutes as liquidity, leverage, tangibility and CAPEX; meanwhile, cash 
holding ratio of this sector is statistically the highest of all investigated industry sectors. 
Hence, trade-off model is not at work while free cash flow theory may apply in this case. 
A summary of the results of the regressions on the sector samples discussed above is 
constructed in table VI. Note that diagnostic tests are also carried out for these regressions 
and the full results of the tests can be found in Appendix B. 
Table VI. Results summary for industry sub-samples 
Industry CASH %SOE R-square Positive Negative Sinificant
Basic materials 0.062 29% 36%
PROF, SIZE, CFLOW, SOE
LEV, CAPEX, MTB, LIQ, 
TANG, DIV
PROF, LEV, 
CAPEX
Health care 0.095 6% 54%
MTB, CFLOW, TANG, 
PROF, CAPEX
SIZE, LIQ, LEV, SOE, 
DIV
MTB
Oil & Gas 0.158 91% 79%
SIZE, MTB, LIQ, LEV, 
CFLOW, TANG, PROF, 
CAPEX, SOE
DIV
SIZE, PROF, 
DIV
Technology 0.099 15% 65%
SIZE, LIQ, PROF, DIV
MTB, LEV, CFLOW, 
TANG, CAPEX, SOE
LEV, SOE
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V. CONCLUSION 
 
In this paper cash holding is investigated in the emerging market of Vietnam which is different in 
economic and institutional contexts from the developed market. The main purpose of the study is 
to achieve understanding about why firms hold cash from the Vietnamese market’s perspective, 
which is expected to eventually contribute to the literature on under-researched or partially 
explored markets. The investigated sample is composed of publicly-traded firms on Ho Chi Minh 
City and Hanoi stock exchanges in Vietnam, covering a number of key industry sectors during 
the time between 2010 and 2013. Despite its limited length in time, the selection of the 
investigated period is carefully considered from the early stage of the study to ensure the 
availability of data needed, as well as the quality of the data collected, in the context of the late 
development of the market and the delay of Vietnamese companies in their listings on the 
official securities exchange floors. 
The findings of the research represent some level of consistency between Vietnamese sample 
and samples from developed markets regarding the significant impact of leverage, dividend 
payout, profitability and firm size on firms’ cash holdings. This consistency is also found in the 
paper of Al-Najjar (2013) on a group of emerging markets (Brazil, Russia, India and China). 
Leverage and dividend payout are found to be negatively associated with cash balances, as 
largely found in empirical studies for different markets. Firms that generate higher operating 
profit tend to retain cash for their re-financing and re-investing activities; while firms larger in 
size are likely to hold more cash than the others. 
Significant differences from what found in empirical evidence for developed markets include the 
relationship between market-to-book ratio used as the proxy for investment opportunity sets and 
cash holdings among Vietnamese firms. With the application of this proxy in the model 
regression, the study does not find a positive relationship between growth opportunities and cash 
holdings for the Vietnamese sample even though this positive relationship is widely found in 
previous literature on other markets. This similarly applies to liquidity, which is not found as 
predicted by evidence from previous works to be inversely related to cash holdings among firms. 
Consequently, the expected role of asset liquidity as a substitute for cash is not confirmed in this 
case. Instead, there is significant evidence supporting the inverse relationship between asset 
tangibility and cash holding levels for the whole sample. This, in turn, may imply a reliance of 
Vietnamese firms on asset tangibility for the availability of collaterals to raise debts when cash 
balances fall short, rather than on liquidity. Moreover, empirical results from papers on capital 
structure in Vietnam suggest a heavy reliance on short-term borrowings among Vietnamese firms 
(Nguyen and Ramachadran, 2006). This implies a shift of dependence from liquidity to short-
term borrowings as a way of substituting cash in the event of cash shortfall, which somehow 
supports the inverse relationship between leverage and cash holdings as mentioned earlier.  
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At the industry level, it is worth remarking that significant variance is detected when firm 
characteristics are explored for each industry sector regarding the signs of their impact as well as 
the significance in their explanatory power for cash holdings among sector sub-samples. Due to 
industry-specific characteristics, firms in sectors that require higher levels of spending on 
tangible assets and capital expenditures (CAPEX) are likely to have lower levels of cash holding. 
By way of justifying, cash is used to maintain the internally needed levels of CAPEX and 
tangibility for continuous operations; hence, cash balance may fall low when required 
investments increase.  
However, regardless of level of significance, impact of profitability, leverage, firm size, cash 
flow and dividend payout on cash holdings is found to stay almost unchanged in sign for most of 
the industry sectors under investigation. In particular, the fact that profitability and cash flow are 
found to remain positive determinants in most of the industry sub-samples serves to solidify the 
argument that firms in markets with imperfections tend to accumulate cash when they have the 
opportunity to do so because agency costs of debts in these markets are high due to information 
asymmetry, if pecking order theory is applied.  
In institutional context, the influence of state-ownership is more clearly perceived for the sub-
samples that represent a domination of SOEs, which can be seen for firms in Oil and gas sector 
(91%). The findings for this sector sample do not find significance in explanatory power or 
consistency with results for other sectors in terms of impact signs when it comes to the 
associations between cash holding and its ‘off-setting’ determinants. Statistically, no relevant 
trend for leverage, liquidity, asset tangibility and CAPEX could be extracted for this SOE-
dominated industry sector. More importantly, model regression on this sector sample gives 
results of positive impact in all the input determinants on cash holding, with an exception of 
dividend payout. As a result, this may imply the existence of agency costs among these SOEs 
firms where the trade-off model is not at work. On the other hand, profitability, firm size and 
dividend payout remains the same level of significance and impact found for other sectors as 
well as found for the whole sample.  
Opposite to the results for oil and gas sector where most of the firms are SOEs, the findings for 
health care sector, which has the lowest presentation of SOEs in the sub-sample (9%), 
demonstrate a different picture of cash holding and its determinants. Despite being insignificant 
determinants, leverage, liquidity and dividend payout are found to be inversely related to cash 
holdings among health and care firms. Noticeably, health and care firms are the only ones in the 
sample which have cash holdings significantly increasing with MTB ratio. This significant 
relationship is not found either for other sectors or the whole sample although it is largely 
supported by evidence found in previous literature. 
Overall, the paper provides further evidence that trade-off, pecking order and agency costs 
theories all play a critical role in understanding the determination of cash holdings in emerging 
markets. The paper finds the importance of industrial and institutional settings behind the 
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differences in cash holding behaviours across various industry sectors in Vietnam. Non-SOEs 
firms are found to mirror the entire sample better in terms of estimate results; meanwhile, a 
significant existence of agency problems is found at industry level when there is a domination of 
SOEs among firms. However, these agency costs are less pronounced when explored on the 
whole sample. This suggests that in general, agency costs due to state ownership are not severe 
in Vietnamese market (Thieu, 2013; Nguyen and Ramachadran, 2006).  
As a final conclusion, results in this paper contribute to the knowledge of the field through 
findings about a considerable similarity in the way corporate cash holding is affected by the 
same financial determinants. Another contribution is further evaluation of how such an 
institutional factor as state ownership can impact firms’ cash holdings in emerging markets, as 
explored in the Vietnamese context. 
Because of the limited availability of data, particularly data for corporate governance indicators 
at the time of this research, recommendations for research on similar topics for emerging markets 
in the future should take into account a better inclusion of other internal corporate governance 
factors such as board structure, audit processes, and CEO characteristics for a thorough 
understanding of the impact of agency costs on financial decisions of corporations in emerging 
markets. Ultimately, in order to facilitate future research, it is also critical that corporate 
governance in Vietnam draw a better attention for it to be properly perceived and applied by the 
participants in the Vietnamese market. An official quantitative introduction of the first corporate 
governance index for Vietnamese firms should effectively follow as a result. 
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